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¡v PRopsssos Cnp,c Muxao
Trial lawyers are all too
famlliar with cases in which an
insured has purchased coverage
that wasn't appropriate for the
client's situation, either because
the basic insuring agreement in
the policy did not cover a foresee-
able risk in the client's affairs or
the policy contained exclusions or
conditions that made the coverage
illusory for the client. Often the
client has the right coverage, but
under limits of liability that are
patently inadequate given the cli-
ent's circumstances. Sometimes,
for no apparent reason, the other-
wise well-insured client simply
lacks a single coverage important
to the protection of that client.
Too often, the client who has
failed to secure the proper cover-
age in the correct amounts has
supposedly had the benefit of an
agent or broker in buying the in-
surance. Ironicall¡ that agent or
broker's insurance agency mày
have advertised using language
such as "meeting all of your insur-
ance needs."
An all too common example
of the problem is that of auto in-
surance clients who carry policies
containing substantial limits of
Bodily Injury @I), Properry Dam-
age (?D), Medical Pay (X4P), and
even Uninsured Motorist (UIVD
coverage but have no Underin-
sured (Jllvf) coverage or only
$25,000 of UIM coverage. When
pressed by their counsel about
that zpparent inconsistency, the
client will likely display a complete
lack of knowledge about the im-
port of the problem or the fact
that an agent or broker has not
made any recommendation to
remedy it. Ultimately, the only
thing worse than learning that the
defendant driver only carried mini-
mum ($25,000) BI limits is to find
out your otherwise well-insured
client has no UIM coverage or
$25,000limits of UIM.
The Issue in Montana
The problem of absence or
inadequacy of UIM coverage pre-
sents so clearly because there is no
statutory requirement for even a
minimum limit of such coverage
in Montana. BI and PD coverages
are mandated in Montana in mini-
mum amounts by the Mandatory
Liability Protection Act, $6 1-6-301
and the Motor Vehicle Safety Re-
sponsibility Act, MCA 561-6-103
et. xq. Also, auto insurance carriers
are required to offer UM coverage
under MCA 533-23-201.. F{owever,
there is no equivalent statute re-
quiring carriers to offer UIM
coverage.
This is ironic, because pas-
sage o[ the Mandatory Liability
Protection Âct in 1979 created the
market for UIM coverage given
that it meant more people in the
state who drove uninsured before
1,979 would be coerced into dtiv-
ingwith minimum limits after
enactment. This in effect rendered
the UM coverage of the victims
of those minimally insured drivers
useless and left the victims at the
mercy of BI policy limits inade-
quate to pay for a single week in a
hospital.
Given that insurers don't
have to offer UIM in Montana and
its importance for protection of
the state's motorists, the pressing
question is: Does an insurance
agent or broker hzve any duty in
Montana to recommend a particu-
lar coverage in a specific adequate
amount? More specificall¡ what is
the agent or broker's duty, if an¡
to recommend that the insured
purchase UIM coverage and do so
with an adequate limit of liability?
In this article, I will focus on the
agent's duty to explain and recom-
mend auto UIM coverage, though
the law and arguments discussed
can be extrapolated to other cover-
aç lines such as homeowners or
commercial general liability.
Those lawyers who started
practice even as late in the century
as the 1970s will remember when
¡ye resolved most insurance ques-
tions by looking to California
cases, there being a death ofcase
authority in Montana. In spite of
the diligence with which the
Montana Supreme Court has
issued insurance opinions in the
last 30 years, there are still occa-
sional issues for which case law
does not exist in the state. The
specific question of the agent or
broker's duty to recommend UIM
insurance is one such issue. How-
ever, NewJersey in part-icular has
developed a significant line of
common law cases on this issue
that span both the period before
New Jersey statutotily required
UIM coverage in 19841 and the
period during which the state has
required the coverage. The cases
contain some well-reasoned law on
the duty of agents and brokers in
this situation, and, for that reason,
I will base a good deal of this arti-
cle on those precedents hoping
they may be persuasive in Mon-
tana.Beforc doing so, however, it
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is good to review existing Mon- with a company selected by faithfully discharge the trust
tzlabw on the general Juties of the assured, or, in the ab- reposed in him, and he may
agents and brokãrs in procuring sence o[ any selection by become liable in damages
irl1,rrance for the insuied and in him, then with a company for breach of duty. If he is
advising the insured. selected by such broker. instructecl to procure spe-
cific insurance and fails to
Montâna Case Law on the Gen- The coutt noted, "Every do so, he is liable to his
eral Duty to Procure Insurance broker is in a sense an agent, but principal for the damage
Our Seminal authority on every agent is not a broker," dìf- suffered by reason of the
the agent's duty to procure insur- ferentiating the broker by the fact want of such insurance. The
un 
", 
Gty u. liabilitY of
Lauina State lllllillllll : the agent
Bankzwas de- i with resPect
cided in 1921. Negligence on the part of the agent defeating in whole or to the loss is
The Lavina State in part the insurance that he is directed to secure will that which
Bank operated an render him liable to his principal for the resulting loss. would have
insurarrce busi- fallen uPon
ness through its
had the in-vice president
who wrote hail insurance for that, as an intetmediary or middle- surance been effected as
Flartford Fire Insurance Com- man, he accepts insurance applica- contemplated. Negligence
pany. Plaintiff,Gay, zlocal farmer, tions and "acts in a certain sense on the part of the agent de-
sig"ed a promissory note with the as the agent of both parties to the feating in whole or in part
bank inJune to pay for hail insur- transactron." Also, the court found the insurance that he is di-
ance for which he applied. The exclusivity or rathe r lack of it to be rected to secure will render
bank, which later contended the a distinguishing factor. T'he court him liable to hus principal
hail insurance deal was expressly stated the broker's liability in such for the resulting loss.
conditioned on approval of the circumstances as follows:
transaction by its cashier, mailed u Gty v. Lauina State Bank
letter to plaintiff within days refus- An agent who takes his is often quoted and still good law
ing the transaction unless the principal's money under an on the duty of the agent or broker
promissory note was secured. express agreement to pro- to procure insurance. One of the
Þlaintiff, who denied the deal was cure insurance, and unjusti- initial questions in claiming a duty
conditional, took no action on the fiably fails to secure the to procure is whether the intermedi-
letter, and subsequently made a same or make an effort ary is an agent of the insured or an
$1,000 claim when the crop was in that direction, hereby agent of the insurer ot both. In
later damaged by hail in August. assumes the risk and be- Marie Deoníer & Assoc. u- PauI
The court treated the claim comes liable, in case of loss, Revere life Ins. Co.r3 the court
as one for breach of the contract to pzy as much oF the same held that "a soliciting açnt of an
to procure insurance and found as would have been covered insurance company is the açnt of
that the bank was a broker as op- by the insurance policy for the insurer and not of the ìnsured
posed to an agent. which his principal had for the pulpose of soliciting and pro-
paid, provided the same had curing the insurance and preparing
An insurance broker is one been procured as directed. the applicatron." The court estab-
who acts as a middleman lished that an independent insurance
between the assured and And as between the insured broker who ìs authorized to solicit
the insurer, and who solicits . and his own agent or broker applicatrons from insureds zLnd pro-
insurance from the public authorized by him to pro- cure the sale of the insurels policies
under no employment from cure insurance, there is the is an agent of the insurerwith te-
any special company, but, usual obligation on the part spect to duties owed by the insurer
having secured an order, he of the latter to carry out the to its açnts. The corollary is that the
either places the insurance instmctions given hrm and açnt's negligence in failing to pro-
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cure insurance can be imputed to
the insurer in such a czse.
The Clienfs Request for Insurance
In the 1983 case of Lee u.
Andtews,a plarntrff, Iæe, brought
an action for breach ofcontract to
procure auto insurance. Iæe had a
long-term relationship with An-
drews, an agent for State Farm,
and had at times
carried auto, fire,
and life insurance
policies through
hum. When Lee
wanted to lease a
car,he told An-
drews he would
need insurance.
Andrews said he "would take carc
of it." As the court later noted,
"They did not discuss the amount
of coverage, the terms of the pol-
icy, the amount of the premium,
or the names of the insureds."
However, the lessor of the vehicle
later called the ,{.ndrews agency to
verifir insurance to satis$r GMAC,
the vehicle's financier. Andrew's
wife apparently provided the les-
sor information that the limits
would be $100,000/$300,000 and
$25,000 for property damage and
fhat"itwould be taken c^re of."
She left a note forJim Andrews
with the year, make, model, and
serial number of the auto and the
coverage sought. GMAC appar-
ently also made telephone confir-
matìon of the insurance with the
Andrews agency. Læe never filled
out an application or paid ar,.y pre-
mium, and no policy was issued.
Three months later, Iæe col-
Iided with a motorcyclist and suf-
fered a $152,000 judgment for the
motorcyclist's injuries and dam-
ages at which point State Farm de-
nied the existence of any policy or
coverage. State Farm won a de-
claratory action in Federal Court
and ultimately proceeded to iury
trial in State District Couft against
Jim Andrews on the single clarm
oIbreach of contract to procure
insurance. The iury found An-
drews liable but also found l-ee's
conduct had prevented the pro-
curement. The Montana Supreme
Court granted tæe a iudgment not-
withstanding the verdict and re-
manded for a new trial on dam-
ages alone. In doing so, the court
cleaÃy had to supply much oFthe
subject of the insurance by impli-
cation or inference, the insured
having provided the agent with
little more than the fact that he
wanted auto insurance in order to
lease an Oldsmobile Toronado.
With regard to damages, the
court cited Gay u. Lauina State
Bank for the proposition that, ìn a
case for failure to procure insur-
ance, the measure of damages "is
that which would have fallen upon
the company had the insurance
been effected as contemplated"
including costs of defense and the
damage award to the amount of its
policy. However, the court also
noted that "damages from the
[underlying] $Tilson judgment, at-
torney fees in that action, and the
damages resulting from having to
borrow money at 20 percent inter-
est are all proper evidence of dam-
ages." As the court explained,
"Montana law provides that the
measure of damages for breach of
contract 'is the amount which will
compensate the party aggrieved
for all the detriment which was
proximately caused thereby or in
the ordinary course of things
would be likely to result there
from.' S27-1-31 1, MC.A."
R.If. Gtovet, fnc. u. Flynn
Ins. Co.rs cited Zee u. Andtews;
to confirm that, in order to place
an agent under a duty to procure,
Montana law "requires a client's
request to procure certain insur-
ance, followed by an agent's com-
mitment to do the same." In
Gtove4 the
court found no
duty to procure
where the
àgerrcy mistak-
enly issued a
general contrac-
tor a cefttficzte
as proof that a
subcontractor had insurance when,
ìn fzct, no such insurance existed.
The court said ¡vith no duty to
procure, no contract could be
created where there was no offer
or acceptance, just a mistake in
issuing a certificate.
The insured's duties were
further developed in McKeuitt v.
MungerrT where a contractor who
needed an insurance bond to place
a bid for an insurance contract
waited until the last minute to re-
quest that the agent get the bond,
sent the application to town in his
friend's trucþ and was out of com-
munication while the agent tried
unsuccessfully to acquire the bond.
In the circumstances, the court re-
fused to impose a duty to procure
on the agent. Instead, in dicta; the
court recognized a duty of the in-
sured to (1) let açnt knowwhere he
is, (2) allow time for the açnCs best
efforts, (3) make the application
timely.
In Fillinger v. l{otthwest-
em Agency, Inc. of Great FaIIs,s
the court decided the insured has
no absolute duty to read the policy
to determine whether the agent
has procured the insurance sought.
Rather, the court said the isle is
To þa¿e 10
attorney fees in that action, and the damages
resulting from having to borrow money at 20 percent
interest are all proper evidence of damages.tt
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whether it is unreasonable in the ance client makes a reasonably would be unreasonable in the cir-
circumstances not to do so. In clear request for insurance and the cumstances not to do so.
Fillingetrthe court approved à zgent undertakes to procure it, the One can see that the general
jury in-struction that ,"iã, "An in- agent has a duty to procure. If the law of the agent's duty in Montana
,.r.^.. policyholder has no duty açnt breaches that duty by not does not address our specifìc ques-
to read ti.t" påt.y unless under the making reasonable efforts to pro- tion, whether the automobile in-
circumstanðes it is unreasonable cure and either procuring or timely surance agent has a duty to explain
not to rcad it.', The court also notiÊ7ing of the inability to pro- and recommend UIM coverâge to
quoted with ap- afl insured in
pror.al 
^"tut"- ¡l¡ll¡lll¡ 
Montana. This
ment from 
^ 
issue was raised
1978 pennsyl- Once the insurance is procured, the insured has no in FederalJudge
vania case of absolute duty to read and analyze the policy to determine Molloy's court by
Fiorcntino v. whether the agent has procured the right coverage. Gary T.zdtckin
Ttavelets Ins. Moss v' State
Co.:s Farm Mut
Auto. fns. Co.,
When the insured informs
the agent of his insurance
needs and the agent's con-
duct permits a reasonable
inference that he was highly
skilled in this are4 the in-
sureds reliance on the agent
to obtain the coveraç that he
has represented that he will
obtain is fustifiable. The in-
sured does not have an abso-
lute duty to read the policy,
but rather only the duty to act
reasonably under the circum-
stances. The circumstances
varywith the facts of each
case, and depend on the re-
lationslup between the
agent and the insured.
Also import ant in Fillinger
is the court's holding that it is
witlun the common experience
and knowledge of lay iurors to de-
termine whether an insurance
agent reasonably fulfilled his or
het duty and procured the cover-
age requested.
Summary of Montana Law on
General Duty to Procure
From the foregoing cases,
Montana law regarding the agent's
duty to procute might include the
following princrples: If the insur-
cure, then the agent is liable for
the full amount of damages the
insurer would have incurred if the
insurance had been in place. The
client, on the other hand, must
place a clear order, make it timely
so that the insurance can be pro-
cured, and be available for com-
munication about the application.
Whether the intermediary's
negligence in not procuring insut-
ance can be imputed to the insur-
ance company depends on the in-
termediary's status. If he is a solic-
iting agent for the insurer, his neg-
ligence may be imputed under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. If
he is a broker, that is, one taking
offers from insureds and selecting
insurers and placing insurance with
them, then he owes a duty to pro-
cure insurance to the insured but is
not deemed 
^n 
zgent of the in-
surer, so that his negligence will
not be imputed. In that circum-
stance, the insured will have to
look only to the broker for com-
pensation if the broker negligently
fails to procure the insurance.
Once the insurance is procured,
the insured has no absolute duty to
read and znalyze the policy to de-
termine whether the agent has
procured the right coverage. That
duty may exist, however, if it
28 M.þ-.R. 204 Q00I). There, the
parties stipulated that State Farm's
agent had not advised Mosses of
the existence of UIM and that
Mosses would have purchased it
had the agent done so. Zadtck u-
gued that the court should decide
as a matter of law in summary
judgment that the agent has a duty
at common law to offer the in-
sured UIM coverage. Judge Molloy
declined to do so and ruled that
the issue of whethet there was
such a duty in the circumstances
was for the jury to decide. Judge
Molloy indicated that the fact that
the insurer's own manuals in-
structed the agent to offer UIM
was not a basis for a finding of
negligence per se but was evidence
that the jury could consider in de-
tetmining whether the agent had a
duty to offer UIM. Because Mon-
tanahas not answered the ques-
tion whether the agent has a com-
mon law duty to offer UIM cover-
age,it is good to review the line of
cases in which the NewJersey
courts have dealt with this issue.
NewJersey's Line of Cases on
the Specific Duty to Recom-
mend UIM Coverage
We begin our look at New
Jersey's common law on the
'ì:
:tl;
:t:
¿l
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agent's duty with Ridet v. Lynchlo
ìn1964. The case achrally involved
auto BI coverage, but in remanding
the case for trial against the agent
for failing to recommend the
needed coverage, the court set out
an oft-quoted statement that would
make an excellent jury instnrction:
One who holds himself out
to the public as an insurance
broker is required to have
the degree of skill and
knowledge requisite to the
calling. ìVhen engaged by a
member of the public to ob-
tain insurance, the law holds
him to the exercise of good
faith and to possess reason-
able knowledge of the types
of policies, their different
terms, and the coverage
availalle in the area in which
his principal seeks to be pro-
tected. If he neglects to pro-
cure the insurance or if the
policy is void or rnatenally
deficient or does not provide
the coverage he undertook
to supply, because of his fail-
ure to exercise the requisite
skill or diligence, he becomes
liable to his principal for the
loss sustained thereby.
The court made a second
statement regarding request by im-
plication that has become a quoted
companion in subsequent decisions
and would also make an excellent
jury instruction:
Thus, an insurance broker, in
dealingwith his client, ordi-
narily invites them to rely
upon his expertise in procur-
ing insurance that best suits
their requirements. It is not
necessary for the client in
order to establish a breach of
duty to prove that he laid out
for the broker the elements
of a contract ofinsurance. It
Montana
Pattern .:lì
'!iìi¡xx¡¡'
Instructions
The Montana Trial Lawyers
Association MPI Committee is
committed to developing and
maintaining the best possible set of
pattern instructions. The Committee
welcomes suggestions from MTLA
members, especially in developing
areas of the law or in areas where
there are presently no published
pattern instructions.
lf you have suggestions,
please contact:
Mike Wheat, Chairman
MTLA MPI Committee
P.O. Box 838
Helena, MT 59624
Or email them to: trial@mt.net
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is sufficient to show that he
authorized procurement oI
the insurance needed to
cover the risks indicated
and that the broker agreed
to do so but failed or ne-
glected to perform his duty.
The terms of the contract
to procure
the insur-
ance, the
scope ofthe
risk and sub-
ject matter to
be covered,
may be
found by im-
plication. The principal
does not sue on z contrzct
ofinsurance; he seeks re-
covery for the loss occa-
sioned by the failure to pro-
cure such a contrzct or such
a valid contract.
This law from Ridetwas
subsequently quoted and made the
basis of the NewJersey case of
Johnson v. MacMillanrll which
follows and is particulady compel-
ling on the issue of the agent's
duty to advise the client of UIM
covefage.
The Duty to Advise of Avail-
ability of UIM Coverage
In 1983, plaintiffs CaÃ and
Mildred Johnson) were severely
in¡ured in a collision with a cat
driven by McMillan who only car-
ried the minimum $15,000/
$30,000 BI covetage required by
the State of NewJersey. The
Johnson policy contained no Un-
derinsured Motorist (UIM cover-
age. Johnsons had, since the
1950s, bought all of their home-
owners, commercial, and auto in-
surarice through agent, Guy
Puffer, President of the Puffer
Agency, Inc. Puffer testified that
he personally attended to John-
son's insurance needs and that
Johnsons followed hts recom-
mendations. He placed John-
son's auto insurance with
Selective Risks Insurance Com-
pany with whom he had entered
an "Agency Agreement" by
which he was an independent
contractor in a non-exclusive
relationshrp. Johnson's policy
with Selective covered four vehi-
cles for $200,000 liability, but pro-
vided the minimum UM coverage
of $15,000/$30,000 and no UIM
coverage.
Puffer admitted that he
never advised Johnsons about
the existence of UIM coverage
because he didn't know about it.
However, evidence attÀal showed
that the insurer, Selective Risks,
sent its agent/brokers notice of
availability of the coverage in 1973
and again in 1983. Also, Puffer ap-
parently received ISO mailings on
UIM coverage. The trial court
found Puffer negligent and deter-
mined thatJohnsons would have
purchased $200,000 UIM coverage
if they had been advised of it. The
court reformed the insurer's con-
tract to include UIM coverage in
that amount.
On appeal, the court quoted
the above statements from Rider
and affirmed that the agenthad a
duty to explain and recommend
UIM to theJohnsons. The court
agreed that Johnsons, if told,
would have purchased $200,000
limits of UIM coverage. However,
it also found that the Puffer
agency was ân independent con-
tnactot, so that its negligence was
not imputed to the insurer but
born only by Puffer. Accordingly,
it was error for the trial court to
reform Selective's policy, and
Johnson's recovery was limited to
liability of Puffer.
The Duty to Advise of Higher
Limits
Whether the
agent has a duty
to advise the in-
sured of the
availability of
higher limits of
UIM coverage is
the next ques-
tion. In the NewJersey case of
Sobotor v. Pndential Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co.,rz the insured asked
the agent for BI limits of
$100,000/$300,000 and also indi-
cated he wanted the "NewJersey
package that is the best avzilalle."
The agent provided him BI limits
of $100,000/$300,000 and UIM
coverage for only the stah"rtory
minimum limit of $15,000 even
though Prudential offered UIM of
$100,000/$300,000 for an addi-
tional $5 premium.
The appellate court in
Sobotot afftrmed the trial judge's
conclusion lhzt " an insurance
agent has an afftrmatle duty to
advise his client of the availability
of higher monetary limits for the
coverage requested." The court
found that the duty is owed re-
gardless of whether the intermedi-
ary is an agent or a broker, since
each owes the same duty to the
insured, the difference only lying
in therr duties to their insurance
companies. l(/hether the agent has
a duty to advise of additional in-
surance cove(age depends on the
particular relationship between the
insured and the agent or broker.13
It depends on the agent's holding
himself out as having special ex-
pertise in insurancela and may de-
iudge's conclusion tlnat"an insurance agent has an
affirmative duty to advise his client of the availability of
higher monetary limits for the coverage requested.tt
I
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pend on the length of the relation-
ship between agent and insured.ls
Howevet, the court ín Sobotot
said:
The "fiduciary'nature o[
such a relationship should
not depend on the length of
the relationship. Because of
the increasing complexity of
the insurance industry and
the speci alized knowledge
required to understand all of
its intricacies, the relation-
shrp between an insurance
4gent and a client is often a
fiduciary one. Agents should
be required to use their ex-
pertise with every client, not
only those with whom they
have a long-term relation-
thip."
The insurer in Sobotot also
contended that the duty owed the
insured is limited to what the in-
sured "specifically and expressly
requested." Howevef, the court .
found that argument did not
"negate the existence of a fiduciary
duty to inform respondent of the
additional coverage" and that the
client's request for the "best avail-
able" coverage actually invoked
the duty.
Finally, the court noted the
role of adhesion contracts in its
reasoning by quotrng from the ear-
lier NewJersey case of lfat v.
ALlstate Ins. Co.16
We have realistically faced
up to the factthat insurance
policies are complex con-
tracts of adhesion, prepared
by the insurer, not subiect
to negotiation, in the case of
the average person, as to
terms and provisions and
quite unintelligrble to the
insured even were he to at-
tempt to read and under-
stand their unfamiliar and
technical language and awk-
ward and unclear 
^îrange-ment. Recognition is gven
to the usual and justifiable
reliance by the purchaser
on the agent, because of
his special knowledge, to
obtain, the protection he
desires and needs, and on
the agent's representation,
whether that agent be a so-
called'independent' but au-
thorized representative of
the insurer, or only an em-
ployee. !7e have stressed,
among other things, the aim
that average purchasers of
insurance are entitled to the
broad measure of protection
necessary to fulfill their rea-
sonable expectations; that it
is the insurer's burden to
obtain, through its repre-
sentatives, all information
peftinent to the risk and the
desired coverage before the
contract is issued; and that
it is likewise its obligation
to make policy provisions,
especially those relating to
coverage, exclusions and
vital conditions, plain, clear
and prominent to the
layman.
The Sobotor court con-
cluded that the agent must "deal
with laypeople as laypeople and
not as experts in subtleties of
law."17
ln Walker v. Atlantic
Chrysler Plynouth, fnc.rll the
NewJersey court found that the
agent had a duty to recommend
that the insured obtain greater
UIM coverage even though the
insuted had not requested (as in
Sobotol "the best available cover-
zge" or gven any specific instruc-
tions for coverâge. There, the in-
sured business's instructions were
simply to "cover us." The agent
arranged $500,000 BI limits, excess
liability coverage of $5,000,000,
and UIM limits of only $L5,000,
the statutory minimum in Nev¡
Jersey atthat time. The court
found the agent had a duty to ex-
ercise'þood faith and reasonable
skill in procuring the insurance
sought or needed by his client"
and indicated the client was
"entitled to rely on the special skill
and knowledge possessed by the
agent in order to best obtain the
desired coverage."
The Agent's Duty to Advise the
Insured when the Carrier has
Dropped or Reduced Coverage
Does the agent or broker
hzve a duty to advise the insured
when the insurer drops or reduces
Z coverage and to recommend op-
tional replacement coverage? In
Wassetman v. Whaftonle the
plaintifî W assermans were struck
by a taxicab while crossing an in-
tersection. They were insured by
Newark Insurance Company for
auto coverage including BI limits
of $100,000/$300,000 but no UIM
coverage. In fact, UIM coverage
had at one time been part of their
auto policy package, apparently
provided without separate pre-
mium, until the insurer sent them
written notice canceling it and ad-
vising of the optron to purchase it
for a separate premium.
l7asserman did not understand the
import or gravamen of the in-
surer's notice and did not purchase
UIM coverage. The taxicab that
struck l7assermans only carried
the minimum mandatory limits of
BI coverage of $1 5,000/$30,000.
Wassermans sued their bro-
ker contending that the broker had
a duty to explain the import of the
insurer's notice and to recommend
to them purchase of an appropri-
ate amount of UIM coverage. T'he
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appellate court reversed the trial owners insurance first purchased specific representation by the
.ãrrr,,, grant of summary iudg- in 1963 with liabiliry limits of agent or broker. Though the court
-".,t to-th" broker. The-appeilate $25,000. In successive renewals disagreed with the insurer's argu-
court said the proposition that a over more than2í years, Allstate ment that the duty would be im-
broker does not have a duty in all agents had never recommended possible to fulfill, it noted that the
circumstances to explain available increasing the limits of liability in insurers had not been alerted to
coverage cannot be used to iustift spite of upward trends in costs, the possible duty by ptior case law
..not aãvising a long-term client liability verdicts, and inflation in or legislation and that it was
that critical cov- "difficult to fix
erage which he
already has is àProPosed drrtY."
not only being Nevertheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court eventually
unilateially set the limit on the duty of agents or brokers to The Duty to
withdrawn but recommend additional coverage to their clients. Recommend
is replaceable at UIM in Other
nominal Jurisdictions
charge." (Ihe -.-.- The agent's dutY
broker could have advised general. Similady, the other defen- to explain and recommend UIM
ìØassermans to buy $100,000/ dant homeor¡¿ner in the case coverage is recognized in at least
g300,000 UIM coverage limits for bought a policy in 1977 with a one other jurisdiction. In 1981,
under $L0.) $25,000 liability limit that was during a period when Minnesota
Limits on the Duty in
NewJersey
Ultrmatel¡ New Jersey de-
veloped what its Supreme Court
has described as a'þroliferation
of cases dealing generally with
the duty of brokers and agents to
insureds concerning UM/UIM
co.v et? ge." 20 Nevertheless, the
NewJersey Supreme Court even-
tually set the limit on the duty of
agents or brokers to recommend
additional covetage to their cli-
ents. In Chen Lin Vang v.
Allstate Ins. Co.21in 199L, the
NewJersey Supreme Court re-
fused to find a general duty on the
paft of insurance agents and
brokers to advise their insureds
of the possible need for higher
policy limits upon renewal of the
policy.
That case involved severe
injuries to plaintrff whose auto
collided with a tree as a result of
her attempt to avoid two dogs
playing in the streets. She ulti-
mately incurred a stipulated $L.2
million in damages. One of the
owners of the dogs had home-
never increased. Judgment was en-
tered against each defendant who
in turn asserted claims against their
insurers for failing to advise them
to increase their liability cover-
age. Allstate's insured home-
owner assigned his potential
claims against ¡{llstate to the in-
jured plaintiff for a promise not
to execute against that defendant
on the judgment.
The issue that ultimately
reached the NewJersey Supreme
Court was whether an insurer
owes a general duty to advise the
client regarding the necessity of
increasing coverage amounts. The
court agreed that the duties devel-
oped in the UIM auto coverage
cases like Sobototandits progeny
cited above also applied to agents
and brokers in homeovzner's cov-
erage. However, the court refused
the invitation to find a general
duty to review and recommend
increased coverage indicating it
would only do so in showings of
"special citcumstances" which it
did not find in Chen Lin Wang.
The court noted the absence of a
specific request by the insured or
had no statute requiring UIM to
be offered, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court held in Cailson v.
Mutual Seruice Ins.zz that, under
common law, zrt insurance agent
can have a duty to offer, advise, or
furnish insurance coverage to an
insured provided that the special
circumstances surrounding the
transaction and the relationship of
the agent with the insured create
such a duty. (t\4innesota now statu-
torily requires the offer of UIM
covenge.B) In the Connecticut
case of Dimeo v. Butns, Btooks
& McNeilr2a the court also af-
firmed a"duty to explain unin-
sured motorist coverage and the
consequences ofnot having suffi-
cient coverage." Though the case
involves UM and not UIM cover-
age, it may be persuasive prece-
dent.
On the other hand, Missouri
appellate courts consistently refu se
to find such a duty and are reluc-
tant even to fìnd any fiduciary duty
in the relationship of the insurance
agent with the client. In Fatmets
fns. Co., fnc. v. McCathy,zs the
Missouri court recognized only the
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agent's duty to procure insurance and to
inform the client if the insurance or-
dered can't be procured, but rejected
any duty to advise the insured of the
availabìlity or advisability of UIM cov-
erâge. The court found such a duty
would to be too burdensome for the
insurers, would make them financial
advisers, would require them to shoul-
der the insured's responsibility, would
possibly require them to advise of bet-
ter coverage at other companies, and
would allow clients to assert after the
fact that they would have bought the
coverage had they known. The court
noted the absence oî any statute in l\4rs-
souri requiring UIM coverage and re-
fused to act by "judicial fiat."
In Banes u. Maftinrz; znd Clifton
v. Allstate Ins. Co.rzz Missouri courts
summarily rejected the duty even though
the insureds in each case asked for "full
coverage" and were provided policies
with no UIM coverage. The court in
Banes noted that the client did not spec-
i$r what "full coverage" included and
did not say what she wanted in addi-
tion to her previous policy coverages.
The court held the agent"had no duty
under the facts of this case to advise
Banes of underinsured motorist cover-
age." In Clifton, the court said agents
rn Missouri "hàve no general duty to
advise customers of their particular in-
surance needs or ofoptronal coverage
that rnay be available " citing the fact that
the insurer had mailed out a written no-
tice of avulability of UIM coverâge.
In the Kentucky case of MuIIíns
v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co.r28 the
court found no duty of the agent to ad-
vise the insured of UIM coverage but, in
doing so, said that there could be such
a duty if the course of dealing over an
extended period of time would put the
agent on notice that the insured was
seeking and relying on the advice or if
the insured clearly asked for the ad-
vice. ,{,lso, the court indicated that an
agent could assume such a duty if their
advettising said they advised or held
themselves out as insurance advisers.
Conclusioú
So long as Montana has no statute requiring that UIM cover-
age be offered by auto carriers in the same manner as UM cover-
àge, many auto insurance consumers in Montana. ate going to lack
UIM protection solely because the agents or brokers upon whom
they rely will not explain the coverage to them and recommend
that they buy it in adequate amounts. There should be no question
that it would be unreasonable for ân auto insurance agent to ne-
glect to explain and recommend UIM coverage to the insured.
ìØhat excuse can there be for selling an insured $300,000 limits of
BI coverage and then not encouraging them to protect their own
farrlily with UIM coverage in the same amount if available?
It is time for trial lawyers to advocate the good faith exten-
sion of Montana common lavz to impose a duty on auto.insurance
agents to offer UIM coverage. Insurers have entered a "tight mar-
ket" again, and there is evidence that it may be in their interest to
act.nlly discourage the purchase of UIM coverage which is a nec-
essary protection in a state like Montana where so many people
carry mandatory minimum limits of BI coverage.
The problem of auto insurance agents neglecting to advise
consumers of the existence of UIM coverage can be remedied by
statutorily requiring insurers to offer it just as they do UM cover-
age. The present statute requiring carriers to offer UM, MCA
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533-23-20L, could easily be
amended to include UIM cover-
age. Drafters would need to add a
definition of an underinsured mo-
tor vehicle. Ideall¡ the statute
should incoqporate the language
of the "Damages I-ess Limits"2e
coverage Form. Under that lan-
guage, an underinsured motor ve-
hicle is one for which the available
liability insurance limits are not
adequate to cover the insured's
tort damages. Á,nother option is
to incorporate language from the
"Limits I-ess Limits" or'Difference
of the Limits"3o coverage form
thereby defining an underinsured
motor vehicle as one having bod-
ily iniury liability limits less than
the UIM limits of the insured
plaintiffs auto. For the consumer,
the "Damages Less Limits" provi-
sion would be most advantageous
because the "Difference of the
Limits" provision can result in
coverage that is illusory. For ex-
ample, if the BI coverage on the
tortfeasor's vehicle has the same
limit as the UIM coverage on the
plaintiffs vehicle, there is no
'funder-insured motor vehicle"
under the "Difference of the Lim-
its" form, so that plarntiff gets no
benefit from the UIM coverage
even though the declarations page
shows a. sepa:tate premium that the
insured may have been paying for
years. States like NewJersey3l and
Cahfoni*2 require the auto carri-
ers to offer UIM coverage just as
they do with UM, while others like
Minnesota33 outright require the
auto owners to purchase UIM
coverage. It is unlikely that one
could muster the political support
to require that owners carry UM
and UIM coverage, so the former
option is more realistic.
Statutorily requiring that
UIM be offered provides UIM
coverage z ceúain degree of Pro-
tection that it will not otherwise
have. Because UM coverage is of-
fered under statutory mandate, it is
considered a " mzndatory" cover-
age by the Montana Supreme
Court which does not allow insur-
ers to include in their policies off-
sets, conditions, and other provi-
sions that may in fact reduce the
UM coverage below the statutory
minimums. For example, tn SuIlÍ-
van v. Doela the court invalidated
the "workers' compensation off-
set" because it could reduce the
UM coverage below the statLltoly
minimum. In McGIynn u. Safeco
fns. Co.r3s the court invalidated
the requirement of 'þhysical con-
tact" between cars in hit-and-run
uninsured motorist accidents on
the ground that the UM stahrte
contained no such condition. Such
offsets and conditions may defeat
UIM coverage because it lacks
statutory protection.
One thing is certain: Auto
ìnsurance consumers in Montana
need the legislative protection of
an act requiring auto insurers to
offer UIM coverage or the judicial
protection of cases placing on auto
agents and brokers the duty to ex-
plain and recommend UIM cover-
age. Either solution requires advo-
cates who can persuade the re-
spective branch of government of
the necessity of this protection for
consumers. It sounds like another
job for the advocates of the MTI-A..
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